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Raze the Debt Ceiling: A Test Case for 
State-Sovereign and Institutional 




In March 2015, the debt ceiling was hit again and sovereign 
default loomed. Refusing to timely raise the debt ceiling, 
congressional ideologues have four times pushed our nation to the 
brink of a catastrophic debt default in as many years. Our 
struggling economy is again threatened, financial institutions are 
again spending millions planning for default, and vulnerable 
citizens are once again worrying about their benefit payments. 
Enough is enough.          
This Essay argues that nationwide bondholder litigation can 
void the unconstitutional debt ceiling, and it presents the first 
litigation in that effort. (Williams v. Lew, No. 15-1565, U.S. Court 
of Appeals - D.C. Circuit). The Constitution guarantees not only 
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that public debt will remain valid, but also that the integrity of 
those obligations will never be so much as questioned by our 
nation’s government. The debt limit statute, facially and 
as-applied, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt 
Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
Bondholders have standing to challenge the unconstitutional 
statute as they suffer economic and noneconomic injuries resulting 
from the degradation of their investments’ uniquely low-risk 
profile and monetary value. These injuries manifest as both 
current harm and certainly-impending future harm.    
In the NAACP and ACLU’s tradition of “test cases,” the 
author’s litigation is prosecuted with modest-success expectations, 
but with strong determination to prompt future litigation by 
others. The Justice Department has already exposed a defense 
strategy based on combining Tea Party default-denial delusion 
with Clapper v. Amnesty International standing hurdles.  
 The Essay pleas for state sovereigns and institutional 
bondholders (with alternative standing allegations) to initiate 
additional litigation. Public interest law firms, such as the 
National Chamber Litigation Center and the Constitutional 
Accountability Center, are challenged to lend support. As bond 
buying has been since the Republic’s founding, this litigation 
effort is a necessary act of economic patriotism. 
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I. Introduction 
In March 2015, the nation again hit the debt ceiling.1 The 
U.S. Department of the Treasury began statutory enforcement 
with “extraordinary measures” to forestall the effects of a 
sovereign default.2 In August 2015, Treasury acknowledged 
specific current harm resulting from the ongoing debt ceiling 
deadlock. Treasury is being forced to reduce its “cash balance” (an 
emergency fund) below the “minimum prudent level” needed to 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Demetri Sevastopulo, Lew Warns Congress Over US Debt Ceiling, 
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0d818286-c9bd-11e4-
a2d9-00144feab7de.html#axzz3bkyIMUfm (last visited June 22, 2015) 
(explaining how the debt limit was reached in March 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012) (providing the public 
debt limit). 
 2. See Peter Schroeder, Debt Limit Deadline Now Seen at End of 2015, 
THE HILL (May 18, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/242404-debt-limit-
deadline-now-seen-at-end-of-2015 (last visited June 22, 2015) (“In March, the 
federal government was again subjected to an $18.1 trillion borrowing cap, 
forcing the Treasury Department to begin employing its set of ‘extraordinary 
measures’ to free up room under that ceiling.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Federal Debt and the Statutory Limit, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE 
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.cbo.gov/publication/49961 (last visited June 22, 2015) 
(explaining Treasury actions to “continue raising cash”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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address “emerging threats such as potential cyber attacks.”3 
Treasury also warned of imminent market distortions resulting 
from its forced reduction in the supply of short-term securities.4 
Congressional ideologues have pushed our nation to the 
brink of a catastrophic debt default four times in as many years 
by refusing to timely raise the debt ceiling.5 Former Treasury 
Secretary Tim Geithner describes their obstruction: “Many of 
them truly seemed to believe that default could cleanse the sins 
of the US economy, which was insane.” Geithner warns that a 
debt-ceiling-caused default will be “economic Armageddon.”6  
Extreme debt-ceiling ideologues strongly object to their own 
party’s leadership compromising on, or using procedural 
maneuvers for, debt limit suspensions or rises: “If reconciliation 
is used to try and raise the debt ceiling, there may well be blood 
on the floor of the House chamber.”7 These ideologues are unfazed 
by warnings of a default’s macroeconomic harm8 or by the angst 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Jason Lange, U.S. Treasury Warns of Debt Cap Impact on Markets, 
Cyber Readiness, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2015, 1:29 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/05/usa-debt-idUSL1N10G16320150805 
(quoting Acting Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets, Seth Carpenter). 
 4. Id.; Kasia Klimasinska & Susanne Walker Barton, Treasury Warns 
Debt Ceiling Deadlock Could Squeeze Bill Market, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2015, 
12:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-05/treasury-warns-
debt-ceiling-deadlock-could-squeeze-bill-market?cmpid=yhoo. 
 5. See Danny Vinik, McConnell to Democrats: Get Ready for Another Debt 
Ceiling Fight!, NEW REPUBLIC (May 1, 2015), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121691/mitch-mcconnell-says-republicans-
will-fight-debt-ceiling-year (last visited June 22, 2015) (discussing some of the 
history of Congress and the national debt ceiling) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 6. TIM GEITHNER, STRESS TEST 465 (2014). 
 7. Nick Timiraous & Kristina Peterson, Debt Limit Drama Returns to 
Political Stage: Negotiations Complicated by Sharp Divisions Among 
Republicans in Congress and Coming Budget Talks, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/debt-limit-drama-returns-to-political-stage-
1426270672 (last visited June 23, 2015) (quoting Rep. Mike Mulvaney) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See, e.g., Matthew O’Brien, Not Raising the Debt Ceiling: A Crisis, if 
We’re Lucky, a Historic Calamity if We’re Not, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/not-raising-the-debt-
ceiling-a-crisis-if-were-lucky-a-historic-calamity-if-were-not/280057/ (last visited 
June 23, 2015) (predicting the negative, large-scale results of a default) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jay Fitzgerald, Debt Ceiling 
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of individual Americans whose very survival is dependent on 
timely receipt of government benefits (payments for Social 
Security, veterans, disability, civil retirement, Medicare, 
Medicaid, etc.).9 Representatives and senators reject reasoned, 
expert counsel that the debt limit statute actually causes 
congressional overspending.10  
 These GOP and Tea Party lawmakers, some of whom are also 
2016 presidential candidates, continue to deny that a harmful 
default will result from a debt ceiling breach.11 For example, 
                                                                                                     
Maneuvering Threatens Economy, Analysts Say, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 13, 2013), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/10/12/debt-ceiling-maneuvering-
threatens-economy-analysts-say/EtLEuIbzsP2bIZhTFWQq9I/story.html#\ (last 
visited June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 9. See, e.g., Sheryl Nance-Nash, Why Seniors Are Mad as Hell, DAILY FIN. 
(July 13, 2013), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/07/13/social-security-checks-
debt-ceiling/ (last visited June 23, 2015) (discussing the effects of not raising the 
debt ceiling on those awaiting government support) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Jason Sadler, Boehner Demands Medicare, Social 
Security and Medicaid Cuts To Raise Debt Limit, NAT’L MEMO (Aug. 27, 2011), 
http://www.nationalmemo.com/boehner-demands-medicare-social-security-and-
medicaid-cuts-to-raise-debt-limit (last visited June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Dylan Scott, Could the GOP Turn Social 
Security Into a Perennial “Crisis” Like the Debt Limit?, TALKING POINTS MEMO 
(Jan. 23, 2015), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/gop-congress-social-security-
cliff-debt-ceiling (last visited June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Barbara Starr, Veterans Groups Summoned to White 
House on Debt Ceiling Impact, CNN (July 26, 2011), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/07/26/debt.veterans/index.html (last visited 
June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 10. See Gary S. Becker & Edward P. Lazear, How ‘Debt Ceilings’ Increase 
Debt, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303448104579149503424494292 
(last visited June 23, 2015) (explaining how some think the debt limit statute 
does not encourage overspending) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 11. See Reena Flores & Ali Tejani, The 2016 Field and the Debt Ceiling, 
CBS NEWS (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/2016-and-the-debt-
ceiling/ (last visited June 23, 2015) (noting the views of prominent GOP leaders 
on the effect of a debt ceiling breach) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Ginger Gibson, Shutdowns, Debt Ceilings Loom: Congress Must Find 
Negotiators, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/shutdowns-debt-ceilings-loom-congress-must-find-
negotiators-1828646 (last visited June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Rachel Bade, Default Deniers Scoff at Debt-
Ceiling Apocalypse, POLITICO (Jan. 16, 2013), 
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Senator Rand Paul states with surprising naïveté: “If you don’t 
raise your debt ceiling, all you’re saying is, ‘We’re going to be 
balancing our budget.’”12 Paul states there is no reason to raise 
the debt ceiling;13 he also made a Facebook pledge not to raise the 
debt ceiling until a balanced-budget constitutional amendment is 
enacted.14 When Republicans pledge not to “default on the debt,” 
it is not a promise to timely raise the debt ceiling. Even 
Republican leaders, such as Orrin Hatch, Chair of the Senate 
Finance Committee, deny that a failure to raise the debt limit 
would result in a Treasury debt default: “I think the 
administration could work on who gets paid and who doesn’t in a 
way that would pull us through.”15    
                                                                                                     
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/default-deniers-pooh-pooh-debt-ceiling-
apocalypse-86253.html (last visited June 23, 2015) (same) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. Jonathan Weisman, Many in GOP Offer Theory: Default Wouldn’t Be 
That Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/us/politics/many-in-gop-offer-theory-default-
wouldnt-be-that-bad.html?hp&_r=2& (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. See Jonathan Easley, Paul: There’s No Reason to Raise the Debt Ceiling, 
THE HILL (Oct. 2, 2013), http://thehill.com/video/senate/326265-paul-theres-no-
reason-to-raise-the-debt-ceiling (last visited June 23, 2015) (expressing Rand 
Paul’s views on raising the debt ceiling) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).   
 14. See Rand Paul, FACEBOOK (Jan. 4, 2013) 
https://www.facebook.com/RandPaul/posts/324885054287210 (last visited June 
23, 2015) (“I will not vote to raise the debt ceiling . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Rand Paul and other default deniers in the 
2016 presidential primary race would presumably refuse to sign legislation 
allowing a debt limit rise or suspension if elected President. GOP presidential 
long-shot Senator Lindsey Graham has attempted to make an issue of his 
primary opponents’ irresponsible, irrational debt limit positions. See Zeke J. 
Miller, Lindsey Graham Challenges Republican Rivals on Debt Ceiling, TIME 
(June 12, 2015), http://time.com/3919067/lindsey-graham-debt-ceiling/ (last 
visited June 23, 2015) (noting Graham “challenging his opponents to take a 
stance on raising the federal debt limit”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 15.  David Weigel, Republican Senator: We Can Crash Into Debt Limit 
“Because the Only People Buying Our Bonds Are the Federal Reserve,” SLATE 
(Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/10/07/republican_senator_we_can_crash
_into_debt_limit_because_the_only_people.html (last visited June 23, 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
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 Congressional default-denial passions were inflamed in 2014 
when the Treasury first acknowledged “technological” capability 
to “make [bond] principal and interest payments while Treasury 
was not making other kinds of daily payments.”16 A basic tenet of 
default denial is that prioritization of bond payments, above any 
of the other eighty million monthly payments made by Treasury, 
would preclude default harm.17 Treasury’s technical capacity for 
bond prioritization over its other required payments does not 
eliminate the legal prohibitions against,18 or mitigate the 
                                                                                                     
 16.  Tim Reid, Treasury Says Debt Payments Could Be Prioritized in 
Default Scenario, CHI. TRIB. (May 9, 2014), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-05-09/news/sns-rt-us-usa-treasury-debt-
20140509_1_debt-payments-debt-limit-bond-payments (last visited June 23, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 17.  See Aaron Blake, Majority of GOP Not Worried About Debt Ceiling 
Lapse, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2013/10/15/majority-of-gop-not-worried-about-debt-ceiling-lapse/ (last 
visited June 23, 2015) (explaining how some leaders are “default deniers”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Brian Faler, Debt-Limit Deniers 
Scoff at Geithner’s Warnings of Default, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-05-02/debt-limit-deniers-say-
geithner-tries-to-stampede-republicans-on-debt-vote (last visited June 23, 2015) 
(same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). GOP congressmen 
have repeatedly failed to pass legislation requiring bond payment prioritization. 
See generally John Avlon, Why We Need the Full Faith and Credit Act, DAILY 
BEAST (May 9, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/09/why-we-
need-the-full-faith-and-credit-act.html (last visited June 23, 2015) (explaining 
the lack of prioritization on requiring bond payment) (on file with Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 18.  Treasury pays its bills as they come due using a classic “First In, First 
Out” (FIFO) procedure with an implicit pari passu intent. See generally Natalie 
A. Turchi, Note, Restructuring a Sovereign Bond Pari Passu Work-Around: Can 
Holdout Creditors Ever Have Equal Treatment?, 83 FORDHAM. L. REV. 2171 
(2015) (discussing the Treasury bill payment process). See also Binyamin 
Applebaum, Treasury to Weigh Which Bills to Pay, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/business/economy/treasury-to-weigh-which-
bills-to-pay.html?_r=0 (last visited June 23, 2015) (discussing how the Treasury 
Department prioritizes bills) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Separately problematic, Treasury’s Financial Management Service is only 
responsible for payment of approximately eighty-five percent of government 
disbursements. The Department of Defense and certain independent agencies 
independently disburse fifteen percent of government payments. See Fact Sheet: 
Payment Management, FIN. MGMT. SERV. (Mar. 14, 2014), 
https://www.fms.treas.gov/news/factsheets/pmt_mgmt.html (last visited June 
23, 2015) (explaining the Department of Treasury’s payment process) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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systemic economic damage that would result from, such payment 
prejudice.19 Yet, the congressional default delusion has only 
worsened. In May 2015, a former House Republican staffer 
publically revealed that the Federal Reserve’s Open Market 
Committee had plans to intervene in the event of a debt-limit 
default.20 The House Financial Services Committee used the 
revelation as justification to formally subpoena the Treasury and 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, demanding any 
contingency plans for a debt-limit-caused default.21    
During Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew’s June 2015 testimony 
before the House Financial Services Committee, Republican 
members referenced Lew’s answers to the committee as 
“disdainful.” Lew again attempted to rationally explain the limits 
of bond payment prioritization: “[W]e do have the technical 
capacity but it would be a terrible thing to do because you would 
be defaulting.” In combative remarks, Representative Mick 
Mulvaney alleged that Lew and the Obama Administration were 
purposely promoting marketplace “chaos” by refusing to assure 
that bond payment prioritization would be implemented in a 
default. Mulvaney stated to Lew: “[A]nswers regarding payments 
                                                                                                     
 19.  See S. Rep. No. 99-144, at 5 (1985) (describing the consequences of 
delayed approval); Prompt Payment Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3901 et seq.; see also Ian 
Katz, Geithner Says Delaying Debt Payments ‘Deeply Irresponsible’, BLOOMBERG 
(June 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-29/geithner-
says-prioritizing-debt-payments-deeply-irresponsible- (last visited June 23, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Neal Wollin, Deputy 
Secretary of the Treasury, Proposals to “Prioritize” Payments on U.S. Not 
Workable; Would Not Prevent Default, DEP’T OF TREASURY (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Proposals-to-Prioritize-Payments-
on-US-Debt-Not-Workable-Would-Not-Prevent-Default.aspx (last visited June 
23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20.  Fed Said to Have Debt Ceiling Plan Involving Market Interventions, 
REUTERS (May 11, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/11/usa-debt-
idUSL1N0Y21UL20150511 (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21.  David Harrison, Head of House Panel Sends Subpoenas to N.Y. Fed and 
Treasury, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/head-of-
house-panel-sends-subpoenas-to-n-y-fed-and-treasury-1431455910 (last visited 
June 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a recent 
article suggesting what the role of the Federal Reserve might be in a default, see 
Charles Tiefer, Confronting Chaos: The Fiscal Constitution Faces Government 
Shutdowns and (Almost) Debt Defaults, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 511, 544–51 (2014). 
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are not being given to us because you want the chaos, because 
you think it’s preferable to you and your administration, this 
administration, to have the chaos, that it will help you achieve 
politically what you want to achieve.”22  
Less than a month later, however, Lew found strong support 
as Congress’ own Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued 
an alarming Report analyzing the market disruptions caused by 
the 2013 default crisis. As one of the three suggested reform 
alternatives, the nonpartisan congressional investigative agency 
proposed that the debt ceiling be eliminated.23 The GAO reported 
that the 2013 marketplace experienced “both a dramatic increase 
in rates and a decline in liquidity in the secondary market where 
securities are traded among investors.”24 Noting that the research 
underlying the Report had been subjected to the econometric 
review of five independent economists,25 the GAO described: 
During recent debt limit impasses, investors reported 
systematically taking actions to avoid certain Treasury 
securities that matured around the dates when Treasury 
projected it would exhaust its extraordinary measures (at-risk 
Treasury securities), including selling them, not purchasing 
them, and not using or accepting them as collateral in 
financial transactions. These actions caused interest rates on 
at-risk Treasury securities to increase. They also caused a 
decline in liquidity for at-risk Treasury securities and 
ultimately added to Treasury’s borrowing costs.26  
                                                                                                     
 22.  Video of Secretary Jack Lew’s June 17, 2015 Testimony Before the 
House Financial Services Committee (C-SPAN television broadcast) [Quoted 
exchange with Rep. Mike Mulvaney at 02:17:39], http://www.c-
span.org/video/?326614-1/secretary-jack-lew-testimony-financial-stability-report. 
See also US’s Lew Spars With Republican Foes of Dodd-Frank, MARKET NEWS 
INT’L (June 17, 2015), https://www.marketnews.com/content/update-uss-lew-
spars-republican-foes-dodd-frank (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 23.  Nick Timiraos, Should Congress Abolish the Federal Debt Limit?, WALL 
ST. J. (July 10, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/07/10/should-
congress-abolish-the-federal-debt-limit/ (last visited July 19, 2015) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 24.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 15-486, DEBT LIMIT: MARKET 
RESPONSE TO RECENT IMPASSES UNDERSCORES NEED TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACHES (2015) [hereinafter GAO Report].  
 25.  Id. at 4, 57. 
 26.  Id. at 12. 
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In perhaps its most disturbing nontechnical revelation, the 
GAO Report used the term “at-risk Treasury securities” 
throughout the report. In the period of time exactly correlated to 
the political rise of the Tea Party, the risk profile of United States 
Treasury investments has been degraded from “risk-free” to 
“low-risk” to “at-risk.”    
According to Congress’s auditing agency, the amount of 
“at-risk” Treasury securities totaled “more than $3 trillion” 
outstanding, which was “25 percent of the debt held by the public 
at the time.” 27 A full one-quarter of all the Treasury debt of the 
United States of America was determined by the GAO to have 
been “at risk” of default.    
Scared investors, large and small, turned to commercial 
paper and to relatively “safe” securities issued by such paragons 
of financial stability as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.28 As the 
Securities and Exchange Commission restricts the ability of 
money market funds to hold defaulted corporate or sovereign debt 
(whether Greek, Argentine, or American), money market 
managers were at the front of the 2013 queue dumping 
short-term U.S. Treasuries. 29     
The marketplace has long had a rational view of debt default. 
Leading bank analyst Richard Bove alerted clients in 2013 that, 
in addition to other severe harms, a default would wipe out the 
Federal Reserve’s working equity and undermine the dollar’s 
value: “The devastation to the United States would be so severe 
that it would take decades to recover from the Depression caused 
by a default and the attendant dumping of trillions of dollars of 
                                                                                                     
 27.  Id. at 14. 
 28.  See id.  
Market participants told us that as substitutes for the at-risk 
Treasury securities, investors used bank deposits, agency discount 
notes—short-term securities issued by government sponsored 
enterprises (GSE) such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal 
Home Loan Banks—and commercial paper—short-term securities 
issued by corporations to raise cash needed for current transactions. 
 29.  See id. at 15 (“Fund managers and other market participants said that 
Securities and Exchange Commission rules also contributed to their decision to 
avoid certain Treasury securities. These rules limit the ability of money market 
funds to hold defaulted securities without the approval of a fund’s board of 
directors.” (citing 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(f) (2010))).   
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U.S. Treasury securities on the global financial markets.”30 In 
October 2013, the ratings firm Fitch placed the United States’ 
credit on a “Ratings Watch Negative.”31 Investment houses, 
institutions, and individuals sold billions of dollars in short-term 
Treasury debt.32 The “TED spread” inverted, evidencing for the 
first time that commercial interbank loans were considered safer 
than Treasuries.33 Large banks and investment houses spent 
millions of dollars to implement default contingency plans, 
including developing plans to partially underwrite customers’ 
government benefits. Financial institutions worked closely with 
the U.S. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
in attempts to develop protocols to mitigate systemic disruption 
to markets in a default. J.P. Morgan alone spent more than 100 
million dollars in such default planning. “With each crisis, the 
once-unthinkable scenario of a U.S. default becomes a little more 
real” to the marketplace.34   
                                                                                                     
 30.  Mike Obel, Treasury Default Could Crash US, Global Economy: Bank 
Analyst Richard Bove, Leading to a Depression Lasting Decades, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/treasury-default-could-crash-us-
global-economy-bank-analyst-richard-bove-leading-depression-lasting (last 
visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 31.  Fitch Places United States’ ‘AAA’ on Rating Watch Negative, REUTERS 
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/fitch-places-united-
states-aaa-on-rating-idUSFit67327220131015 (last visited June 23, 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). After the 2011 debt default 
crisis, S&P downgraded U.S. Debt for the first time in history. See Binyamin 
Applebaum & Eric Dash, S&P Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S. for the First 
Time, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/business/us-debt-
downgraded-by-sp.html (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 32.  See Min Zeng, Uneasy Investors Sell Billions in Treasurys, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 14, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230433090457913594379965548
8 (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
see also D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31967, 
THE DEBT LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 8 (2013) (explaining how the 
debt has been managed in the past). 
 33.  See Katie Holliday, US Treasuries? No Thanks, I’ll Take Bank Debt, 
CNBC (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101115800 (last visited June 23, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 34.  David Henry & Lauren Tara LaCapra, Insight: As U.S. Default 
Threatened, Banks Took Extraordinary Steps, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/19/us-usa-fiscal-banks-warrooms-
insight-idUSBRE9AI05P20131119 (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the 
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Over the objection of its default deniers, and at the twelfth 
hour, in October 2013, Congress temporarily suspended the debt 
ceiling with the quite accurately entitled “The Default Prevention 
Act.”35 Agreeing to allow a subsequent February 2014 
suspension,36 GOP leaders strategically deferred the next debt 
limit battle until after expected Republican 2014 midterm 
victories.37 In spring 2015, the Treasury Secretary was again 
repeatedly writing to Congress—with its House and Senate now 
infused with additional Tea Party default deniers—pleading for a 
raise of the breached debt ceiling even as he began its statutory 
enforcement.38    
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 35.  Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–46, 127 Stat. 
558-71 (2014). 
 36.  Temporary Debt Limit Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 113-83, 128 Stat. 
1001-12 (2014). It was not the “clean” bill as was widely reported. See, e.g., Paul 
Kane, Robert Costa & Ed O’Keefe, House Approves ‘Clean’ Debt-Ceiling Bill, 
Advance it to Senate, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2014) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/house-gop-leaders-will-bring-clean-
debt-ceiling-bill/2014/02/11/1544cf8a-9338-11e3-84e1-27626c5ef5fb_story.html 
(last visited June 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Section 3 was subtitled “Restoring Congressional Authority Over the National 
Debt.” The statute as amended prevented the Treasury from either prepaying 
obligations, building a “cash balance above normal operating balances in 
anticipation of the expiration of such period,” or both. The amendment thus 
envisioned and promoted a future default crisis.     
 37.  See Carl Hulse & Jonathan Martin, Retreat on Debt Fight Seen as 
G.O.P. Campaign Salvo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2014, at A15 (discussing the 
strategy behind delaying the debt limit battle). Even the strategic move by GOP 
leadership was opposed by their Tea Party caucus, with House threats of 
rebellion against the Speaker and a Senate filibuster. Only a few rank and file 
Republicans voted for the 2014 suspension. See Michael C. Bender & Laura 
Litvan, Tea Party Scorns Republicans as House Lifts Debt Ceiling, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2014-02-11/house-
republicansseek-democratic-help-for-debt-limit.html (last visited June 24, 2015) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Brett LoGiurato, Analyst: 
Get Ready for Another Brutal Debt Ceiling Fight After Eric Cantor’s Loss, BUS. 
INSIDER (June 11, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/eric-cantor-loss-debt-
ceiling-fight-2014-6 (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P. Senate Leaders 
Avert Debt Ceiling Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/us/politics/senate-debt-ceiling-increase.html 
(last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 38.  See, e.g., Letter from Jacob Lew, Secretary of the Treasury, to the Hon. 
John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House (March 13, 2015), available at 
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During the most intense times of default crises, calls for 
unilateral Executive action have been frequent.39 In 2011, former 
President Bill Clinton said he would have invoked the Fourteenth 
Amendment to prevent a default “without hesitation and force 
the courts to stop me.”40 Jeffrey Rosen, CEO of the National 
Constitution Center, predicted that the Supreme Court would not 
likely invalidate such a presidential decision to invoke the Public 
Debt Clause.41 Other commentators promoted creative Executive 
solutions including minting a trillion dollar platinum coin.42 All of 
the plans were publically rejected by the Obama Administration, 
however, even as it privately scrambled for options to avoid a 
sovereign debt default.43   
                                                                                                     
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Treasury-Sends-Debt-Limit-Letter-
to-Congress-031315.aspx. 
 39.  See, e.g., Garrett Epps, The Speech Obama Could Give, THE ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/04/the-speech-
obama-could-give-the-constitution-forbids-default/237977/ (last visited June 24, 
2015) (hypothesizing how President Obama could have dealt with the debt 
crisis) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 40.  Adam Liptak, The 14th Amendment, the Debt Ceiling and a Way Out, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/us/politics/25legal.html?_r=0 (last visited 
June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see 
Laurence Tribe, A Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/opinion/08tribe.html (last visited June 24, 
2015) (explaining that the 14th Amendment cannot be invoked to solve the debt 
crisis) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 41.  Jeffrey Rosen, How Would the Supreme Court Rule on Obama Raising 
the Debt Ceiling Himself?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 29, 2011), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/92884/supreme-court-obama-debt-
ceiling (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). See also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Obama Should Raise the 
Debt Ceiling on His Own, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html (last visited June 24, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For more recent 
analysis and exhaustive arguments regarding presidential authority to act 
unilaterally, see generally Zachary Ostro, In Debt We Trust, 51 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 241 (2014). 
 42.  See Christopher Mathews, Three Not-So-Crazy Ways Out of the Debt 
Ceiling Crisis, TIME (Oct. 5, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/10/05/three-
not-so-crazy-ways-out-of-the-debt-ceiling-crisis (last visited June 24, 2015) 
(suggesting alternative solutions for the debt ceiling crisis) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 43.  See Ryan J. Reilly, The Obama Administration Took the Platinum Coin 
Option More Seriously Than it Let On, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2013), 
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There is, however, an unexplored, direct solution to deal with 
this dangerous, unconstitutional statute: bondholder litigation to 
void the debt ceiling.44    
II. Preface: Test Case to Void the Debt Limit Statute 
Default dramas should be unacceptable as policy; instead, 
they have become regular, integral components of the national 
governance process and electoral campaigns.45 Even in an age of 
asymmetric partisan polarization,46 the specter of congressional 
ideologues and their leadership strategizing about how best to 
threaten the validity of the nation’s public debt is disturbing.47  
                                                                                                     
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/03/platinum-coin-
option_n_4351706.html?1386084682 (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 44.  This author first noodled the idea for such a lawsuit in 2011. See Victor 
Williams, Unconstitutional Debt Ceiling: Grandma Bondholder’s Emergency 
Lawsuit if Obama Does Not Invoke 14th Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST (July 
29, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-williams/unconstitutional-debt-
cei_b_913309.html (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Victor Williams, Preventing Debt Ceiling Catastrophe, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-
williams/prevent-debt-ceiling-cata_b_4054950.html (last visited June 24, 2015) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Victor Williams, Lawsuit 
Filed to Void Debt Ceiling: Is Jack Lew a “Default Denier”?, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 27, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-williams/lawsuit-filed-to-
void-deb_b_5393293.html (last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 45.  See Peter Weber, The End of the Debt Ceiling Brinkmanship Should 
Make You Nervous, THE WEEK (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://theweek.com/article/index/256302/the-end-of-debt-ceiling-brinksmanship-
should-make-you-nervous (last visited June 24, 2015) (explaining the 
significance of defaults in politics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 46.  See generally THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE 
THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE 
NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012); Matt Grossman & David Hopkins, 
Policymaking in Red and Blue: Asymmetric Partisan Politics and American 
Governance, APSA Annual Meeting Paper 2014, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2452554##. 
 47.  See Josh Hazan, Note, Unconstitutional Debt Ceilings, 103 GEO. L.J. 
ONLINE 29, 29 (2013) (detailing debt ceiling history and explaining how default 
crises have recently developed). 
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 Can litigation to void the statute accomplish what political 
leaders will not? Jacob Lew and the Treasury Department have 
repeatedly acknowledged the current harm to bondholders from 
the debt limit law.48 Public debt investors hold this nation’s debt 
under a constitutional guarantee not only that the debt 
instruments will remain valid, but also that the “validity” of those 
securities will never be “questioned” by the nation’s government. 
The debt ceiling facially, and as applied, violates that 
constitutional guarantee, causing Treasury investors not only 
both economic and noneconomic injuries, but both current harm 
and impending future harm.   
This Essay summarily presents Williams v. Lew49 as a test 
case to void the debt limit statute. Initiated in early 2014,50 the 
individual effort by this bondholder author follows a long 
tradition of civil rights/public interest litigation using test case 
strategy:  
The key to the NAACP’s litigation success was its use of “test 
cases” the strategy by which an organization seeks to find or, if 
necessary, to create, a legal controversy to establish a point of 
law . . . . The test case idea in turn had its roots in activism by 
civil rights campaigners and corporations stretching far back 
into the nineteenth century . . . . Plessy v. Ferguson was such a 
case.51 
                                                                                                     
 48.  See D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31967, THE DEBT 
LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 20–25 (2013) (discussing Lew’s views on 
the debt limit law’s affect on bondholders). 
 49.  No. 14-00183(RJL), 2015 WL 72968 (D.C.C. Jan. 5, 2015). 
 50.  First Amended Complaint For Declaratory Judgment To Void The Debt 
Ceiling, at 22, ¶¶ 41–42, Williams v. Lew, 1:14-cv-00183(RJL) (D.D.C. 2014), 
2014 WL 1392940. This litigation is a project of the author’s 
DisruptiveJustice.org, which attempts to honor Judge Jerome Frank’s 1940s 
vision of the “private attorney general” who sues on behalf of the public on his 
own private initiative. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 
704 (2d Cir. 1943). The “private attorney general” has no accountability to the 
government, entrenched special interests, or an electoral constituency. Justice 
William O. Douglas, writing for a U.S. Supreme Court majority, affirmed the 
role of a “reliable private attorney general to litigate the issues of the public 
interest.” Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).   
 51.  Susan D. Carle, Race, Class and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP 
(1910–1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 100–02 (2002) (citations omitted).  
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With extremely limited litigation resources and only a 
grudging acceptance of the federal judiciary’s increasingly 
restrictive standing jurisprudence,52 Williams v. Lew was 
prosecuted with modest expectations. The benefits of a test case 
are often indirect and incremental. As evidenced by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP) 
and the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) early use of test 
cases, a first-impression test case may be useful for the 
subsequent analysis of the loss. As 1940s ACLU test cases were 
then described: “Test cases have also been instituted involving 
important new issues which have later been resolved through the 
efforts of other organizations or private individuals.”53  
The first litigation to challenge the debt limit statute, 
Williams v. Lew, is summarized by this Essay to: (1) provide a 
procedural or theoretical template for future bondholder 
plaintiffs; (2) expose the Justice Department’s (nationally 
uniform) defense theory and tactics against such claims as based 
on default denial; (3) explain how the Justice Department’s 
defense arguments against individual bondholder standing serve 
as an invitation for future state-sovereign and institutional 
bondholder litigation against the debt ceiling; and (4) frame 
domestic litigation against the debt ceiling as an act of economic 
patriotism.  
The Essay first analyzes the debt limit statute’s 
unconstitutionality (Part I), then presents the test case summary 
(Part II), and concludes with a plea for state sovereigns and 
domestic institutional bondholders to immediately challenge the 
debt limit statute (Part III). 
A. The Debt Limit Statute’s Patent Unconstitutionality 
On its face, and as it is arbitrarily applied, the debt limit 
statute violates both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt 
                                                                                                     
 52.  See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 
“Injuries” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); see also Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 53.  Comment, Private Attorneys–General: Group Action in the Fight for 
Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574, 580 (1949) (citations omitted). 
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Clause54 and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.55 In 
Perry v. United States,56 the Supreme Court ruled that the 
original 1787 Constitution prohibits debt “repudiation” when 
Congress borrows money on the credit of the United States: “To 
say that Congress may withdraw or ignore that pledge is to 
assume that the Constitution contemplates a vain promise; a 
pledge having no other sanction than the pleasure and 
conveniences of the pledgor.”57 Section Four of the Fourteenth 
Amendment therefore altered the Constitution to guarantee an 
even stronger protection for debt holders and to mandate a broad 
application of that debt protection to all government obligations. 
Section Four prohibits any law or action that so much as 
questions the “integrity of public obligations.”58  
1. The History and Text of Section Four 
                                                                                                     
 54.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. See also, e.g., Chad DeVeaux, The Fourth 
Zone of Presidential Power: Analyzing the Debt-Ceiling Standoffs Through the 
Prism of Youngstown Steel, 47 CONN. L. REV. 395 (2014); Jacob D. Charles, Note, 
The Debt Limit and the Constitution: How the Fourteenth Amendment Forbids 
Fiscal Obstructionism, 62 DUKE L.J. 1227 (2013); Garret Epps, Our National 
Debt ‘Shall Not Be Questioned,’ the Constitution Says, THE ATLANTIC (May 4, 
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/05/our-national-debt-
shall-not-be-questioned-the-constitution-says/238269/ (last visited June 25, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135, 
140 (2005). 
 55.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 56.  294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 57.  Id. at 351. This case was one of the famed Gold Clause Cases. See 
generally Kenneth W. Dam, From the Gold Clauses Cases to the Gold 
Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 
514–18 (1983). 
 58.  Perry, 294 U.S. at 354. The full text of Section Four is instructive:  
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties 
for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume 
or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or 
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. 
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The congressional authors of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Public Debt Clause were resolute “to lay down a constitutional 
canon for all time in order to protect and maintain the national 
honor and to strengthen the national credit.”59 The textual 
analysis, drafting history, and functional purpose of Section Four 
of the Fourteenth Amendment prove that its scope is broad and 
its proscription against the debt limit statute absolute.60   
Section Four proponent Senator Benjamin Wade argued that 
the Treasury bondholder “will feel safer” when the national debt 
is “placed under the guardianship of the Constitution than he 
would feel if it were left at loose ends and subject to the varying 
majorities which may arise in Congress.”61 Even congressional 
critics of the amendment provision, such as Senator Thomas 
Hendricks, recognized that the Clause would “change the 
Constitution for the benefit of the bond-holders.”62 The authority 
of Section Four is best understood in relation with other 
amendment provisions; the Civil War amendments 
fundamentally altered the Republic’s political and economic 
order.63 The Public Debt Clause joins other broadly stated 
provisions of the Thirteen, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments in abolishing slavery,64 ensuring individual rights 
and equal protection of the laws,65 and charging a national 
protection of the right to vote.66 Yale University’s Jack Balkin 
connects the Public Debt Clause’s history and ratified text to its 
                                                                                                     
 59.  Phanor J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 
CORNELL L. Q. 1, 15 (1933).   
 60.  See HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 134 (2003); Jack Balkin, The Legislative History of Section Four of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2011), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/legislative-history-of-section-four-of.html 
(last visited June 24, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 61.  Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
Benjamin Wade). 
 62.  Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2938, 2940 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
Thomas Hendricks). 
 63.  See 2 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATION 230–34 
(1998).   
 64.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  
 65.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 66.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV.   
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continued purpose “to prevent future majorities in Congress from 
repudiating the federal debt to gain political advantage, to seek 
political revenge, or to try to disavow previous financial 
obligations because of changed policy priorities.”67 And just as the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Section One have been broadly applied 
beyond the Civil War context to protect the contemporary liberty 
interests and equal protection rights of all Americans, so should 
the Public Debt Clause of Section Four of the same Fourteenth 
Amendment be broadly applied to protect the contemporary 
interests of all Americans regarding government debt 
obligations.68 
2. Perry v. United States: “Whatever Concerns the Integrity of the 
Public Obligations” 
 The Perry v. United States plurality ruled that the 
congressional statute at issue was a direct violation of the Public 
Debt Clause. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes’s opinion 
emphasized that Congress may not “alter or repudiate the 
substance of its own engagements when it has borrowed money 
under the authority which the Constitution confers.”69 The high 
court explicitly rejected sovereign immunity as a justification for 
congressional interference with bondholders’ rights and further 
stated that “[h]aving this power to authorize the issue of definite 
obligations for the payment of money borrowed, the Congress has 
not been vested with authority to alter or destroy those 
obligations.”70 The Perry ruling established an expansive scope 
for the Public Debt Clause’s proscription; “[n]or can we perceive 
                                                                                                     
 67.  Balkin, supra note 60. Public Debt Clause proponents recognized that 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s elimination of slavery and Section Two of 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “counting the whole number of persons in each state” 
apportionment method would result in an increase in southern states’ 
representation in Congress and the electoral college. Id. 
 68.  For an excellent expansion of consistent reading of Fourteenth 
Amendment provisions and relevant references to recent lower court cases 
noting Perry, see Ostro, supra note 41, at 258–60. 
 69.  Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935). 
 70.  Id. at 353–54.  
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any reason for not considering the expression ‘the validity of the 
public debt’ as embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the 
public obligations.”71  
The importance and breadth of Perry’s authority has been 
analogized to that of Marbury v. Madison.72 Other helpful 
commentators apply Perry to explain that Section Four was 
drafted, passed, and ratified to “prevent precisely the abuses” of 
the debt ceiling’s operations.73 Princeton University’s Sean 
Wilentz argues: “As the wording of the amendment evolved 
during the Congressional debate, the principle of the debt’s 
inviolability became a general proposition, applicable not just to 
the Civil War debt but to all future accrued debts of the United 
States.”74    
3. Abramowicz, Buchanan, and Dorf’s Analyses of Section Four 
and the Debt Limit Statute 
The debt limit statute’s unconstitutionality was widely 
debated by academics during recent years’ political conflicts and 
debt crises.75 George Washington University’s Michael 
                                                                                                     
 71.  Id. at 354. 
 72.  5 U.S. 137 (1803). Recent scholarship has refreshed the known 
comparison of Perry and Marbury, noting the foundational nature of their 
constitutional jurisprudence and that the two opinions appear to share a 
“rights-remedy” gap. See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, The Gold Clause Cases and 
Constitutional Necessity, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1243, 1265–68 (2012). Historian Arthur 
M. Schlesinger described Perry as a “masterpiece of judicial legerdemain hardly 
matched in the annals of the Court since Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. 
Madison.” Id. at 1246 n.11. Although Professor Henry Hart criticized the Perry 
remedy as “manifestly useless” for the Perry bondholder, he presciently noted 
that the Perry remedy “may not always be useless under different 
circumstances.” Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Gold Clause in United States Bond, 48 
HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1057–58 n.2 (1935). 
 73.  Sean Wilentz, Obama and the Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2013, at A27. 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Secretary Geithner Understands the Constitution: 
The Republicans Are Violating the Fourteenth Amendment, BALKANIZATION (July 
8, 2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/07/secretary-geithner-
understands.html (last visited June 26, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Review); Garrett Epps, The Constitution’s Latest Blaze of Notoriety: Bad for 
the Republic, ATLANTIC (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/06/the-constitutions-latest-
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Abramowicz’s 1997 interpretation, analysis, and practical 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt Clause is 
foundational to the best of such commentary:76  
A debt does not become valid or invalid only at the moment 
payment is due. A debt’s validity may be assessed at any time, 
and a debt is valid only if the law provides that it will be 
honored. Therefore, a requirement that the government not 
question a debt’s validity does not kick in only once the time 
comes for the government to make a payment on the debt. 
Rather, the duty not to question is a continuous one.77 
Professor Abramowicz updated and rearticulated this 
seminal work in a 2011 working paper that argues Section Four 
bars congressional statutes that merely “jeopardize” the validity 
of debts.78 An act of government repudiation or a technical default 
is not required to trigger protection to public debt holders; the 
                                                                                                     
blaze-of-notoriety-bad-for-the-republic/241308 (last visited June 26, 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Calvin Massey, The Debt and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, THE FACULTY LOUNGE (June 20, 2011), 
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2011/06/the-debt-limit-and-the-fourteenth-
amendment.html (last visited June 26, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Peter M. Shane, What May a President Do if He Cannot Pay 
Our Bills, HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-m-shane/fourteenth-amendment-
debt_b_903487.html (last visited June 26, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Michael Stern, Arrest Me. I Question the Validity of the 
Public Debt, POINT OF ORDER (June 2, 2011), 
http://www.pointoforder.com/2011/06/02/arrest-me-i-question-the-validity-of-the-
public-debt/ (last visited June 26, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 76.  Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth 
Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 580–89 (1997). This work formed the basis 
for Bruce Bartlett’s 2011 commentary and congressional testimony. See Bruce 
Bartlett, What Debt Limit? Plan B is the 14th Amendment, THE FISCAL TIMES 
(June 11, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/06/30/What-Debt-
Limit-Plan-B-is-the-14th-Amendment (last visited June 26, 2015) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 77.  Abramowicz, supra note 76, at 593.   
 78.  Michael Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, Budget Deficits, and the 
Entitlements Explosion: Exploring the Implications of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Public Debt Clause 43–45 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 575, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1874746.  
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Constitution is violated “as soon as Congress passes a statute 
that will lead to default.”79    
The nation’s leading debt-ceiling scholars, Neil Buchanan, 
also of George Washington University, and Michael Dorf of 
Cornell University, have more recently expanded the 
understanding of what constitutes “public debt” to include all 
government obligations. They quite persuasively detail how the 
statute’s operation traps the Executive in an unconstitutional 
“trilemma.”80 The debt ceiling makes the President choose which 
of his three fiscal statutory duties he must violate—spending, 
taxing, or borrowing. In 2014, Buchanan and Dorf further 
explained why operational default is actually “a more dangerous, 
less effective, and more unconstitutional method of violating the 
debt ceiling.”81 After the debt limit statute was again breached in 
March 2015, Professor Buchanan forcefully argued why the debt 
ceiling must be eliminated.82   
As bondholder litigation is required to eliminate the debt 
limit statute, this Essay is thus led back to Abramowicz’s Section 
Four application. While acknowledging the judiciary’s restrictive 
justiciability standards, Abramowicz confidently asserts “the 
Public Debt Clause’s protection of debt-holders provides an 
anchor on which jurisdiction rests comfortably.”83 He addresses 
                                                                                                     
 79.  Id. at 24.   
 80.  See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least 
Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt 
Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (2012); Neil H. Buchanan & Michael 
C. Dorf, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat Once and for All: Why the President 
Should Embrace the Least Unconstitutional Option, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
237, 239–40 (2012); Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Debt Ceiling: When Negotiating over Spending and Tax Laws, 
Congress and the President Should Consider the Debt Ceiling A Dead Letter, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 32 (2013). 
 81.  Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Borrowing by Any Other Name: 
Why Presidential “Spending Cuts” Would Still Exceed the Debt Ceiling, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44, 49–50 (2014).  
 82.  See Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt Ceiling Law Is Fatally Flawed and 
Cannot Be Fixed, VERDICT (Mar. 26, 2015), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/03/26/the-debt-ceiling-law-is-fatally-flawed-and-
cannot-be-fixed (last visited June 26, 2015) (arguing against the debt ceiling) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 83.  Abramowicz, supra note 78, at 46. The working paper was completed 
before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 
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“the specific financial injury” suffered by bondholders84 to assert 
that Section Four “paves the road to judicial enforcement by 
conferring”85 litigation rights: 
If a governmental action is found to be a debt questioning 
under an objective test, then the action has increased the risk 
of default and thus lowered the value of debt, decreasing the 
wealth of debt-holders. If a subjective test identifies a debt 
questioning, then the public is suspicious of a debt’s validity 
and the debt will thus be harder to sell. Either way, a debt 
questioning inflicts a financial injury.86 
Abramowicz concludes that the courts “have not been given the 
opportunity” to enforce the Public Debt Clause, but that a “suit by 
bondholders . . . would provide a test case.”87    
B. Williams v. Lew as a Test Case to Void the Debt Limit 
In February 2014, this author (“Plaintiff”), who holds every 
type and duration of public debt sold by TreasuryDirect.gov88 and 
also holds additional Treasury debt through vested retirement 
accounts, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to void the 
                                                                                                     
1138 (2013). 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.   Id. at 49.  
 87.  Id. at 52.  
 88.  The TreasuryDirect holdings include a Certificate of Indebtedness, 
FRN, TIPS, and various duration of bonds, notes, and bills. The TreasuryDirect 
holdings create a direct enforceable relationship with the United States and 
provide direct evidence of the plaintiff’s ownership of the public debt. The 
plaintiff’s direct ownership should be contrasted with those Treasury debt 
“holders” who are beneficial owners of Treasuries in the commercial book-entry 
system: “The only persons entitled to enforce Treasuries held in the commercial 
book-entry system are the depository institutions with securities accounts at a 
Federal Reserve Bank to which Treasuries have been credited.” Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr., United States Sovereign Debt: A Thoughtful Experiment on Default 
and Restructuring, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT? 169 (Franklin 
Allen et al. eds., 2012),  
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2500&context=facu
lty_scholarship. See 31 C.F.R. § 363 (2012).  
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statute.89 The named defendants were the Treasury Department 
and Jacob J. Lew in his official capacity. The action was pled as a 
fully justiciable individual rights claim,90 sought only prospective, 
specific relief, and was based on the plaintiff’s constitutional 
rights and the defendants’ constitutional obligations in the 
context of the unique “ongoing relationship between the 
parties.”91 The plaintiff pled judicial review of the nonmonetary 
action92 against both the Treasury Department and its named 
Secretary, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
which includes a right of review with an explicit waiver of 
sovereign immunity.93  
                                                                                                     
 89.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2010) (outlining declaratory relief); 28 U.S.C. § 
2202 (1948) (delineating injunctive relief). Alternative mandamus relief is also 
requested.  
 90.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803). Although 
“embarrassing confrontation[s] between coordinate branches of the Federal 
Government” provides political context for understanding the individual rights 
violation, the claim’s review does not ask a “political question” but rather “falls 
within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law.” Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1433 (2012); Martin H. Redish, 
Judicial Review and the ‘Political Question,’ 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1031 
(1985). And the action is ripe for review. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. 
Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978). 
 91.  Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 905 (1988).  
 92.  As the non-contractual claim is explicit that it does not seek money 
remedy, the plaintiff’s pleadings preemptively reject Court of Claims or Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction. Id.; see also Dept. of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 
261 (1999) (citing Bowen, 487 U.S. at 895); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. 
v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212 (2002) (citing Bowen, 487 U.S. at 899). After a 
debt default, any federal court’s subsequent monetary judgment in the plaintiff’s 
favor would be a questionable absurdity as the Treasury-administered 
Judgment Fund would, like all Treasury accounts, be insolvent.  
 93.  5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2011). The rationale for a Larson constitutional 
exception to sovereign immunity is also pled as “the conduct against which 
specific relief is sought is beyond the officer’s powers and is, therefore, not the 
conduct of the sovereign.” Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 
U.S. 682, 690 (1949); see also 1 CIV. ACTIONS AGAINST THE U.S. § 1:3 (Jon. L. 
Craig, ed. 2003) (“The exception to sovereign immunity for actions against 
federal officers seeking specific relief from illegal or unconstitutional conduct 
recognized in Larson is based on the legal fiction that federal officers who act 
unlawfully in the course of their official duties are no longer acting as 
representatives of the government.”).  
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1. The Plaintiff’s Claims: Facial and As-Applied Violations; 
Current and Future Harms; Economic and Noneconomic Injuries 
The Debt Limit Statute currently harms both economic and 
noneconomic interests of the bondholder. The plaintiff holds 
Treasury securities because of their uniquely low-risk profile and 
constitutionally secure value. Both the government and the 
marketplace have consistently described treasury debt as 
“risk-free,” backed by the “full faith and credit” of the nation.94 
The statute’s facial violation of the Public Debt Clause causes the 
plaintiff current economic injury because the low-risk profile of 
his investments are degraded and their value is diminished.95 
This incurs a noneconomic injury because this facial violation 
causes the plaintiff psychic angst and worry about his 
investments’ present validity and integrity.96 
These current injuries intensify when the Treasury enforces 
the unconstitutional statute with “extraordinary measures” just 
before and after an actual hitting of the debt ceiling.97 This as-
                                                                                                     
 94.  See GEITHNER, supra note 6, at 465. Treasury bills are treated as money 
and considered to be substitutes to bank deposits by large investors. Although 
Treasury debt is held by investors as being free of default risk, inflation risk is 
always present, of course.    
 95.  The plaintiff’s pleadings draw explicit parallels between facial 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt Clause and the facial 
violation of other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as determined 
in the Brown v. Board cases. See Brown v. Board (I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown 
v. Board (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) 
(holding that “the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools”). For 
arguments regarding “illegally segregated public schools and illegally-limited 
public debt,” see Victor Williams, Applying ‘Brown’ to Void the Debt Ceiling, 
ACS BLOG (May 23, 2014), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/applying-
%E2%80%98brown%E2%80%99-to-void-the-debt-ceiling (last visited July 8, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 96.  See generally Richard Fallon, Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 
99 CAL. L. REV. 915 (2011). 
 97.  Author asserts that the Treasury Department begins enforcement of 
the debt limit statute—even before the ceiling is hit—with its first use of an 
“extraordinary measure,” implemented to forestall the statute’s inevitable full-
default consequences. Lew Provides Details of Emergency Debt Limit Measures, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/03/13/us/politics/ap-us-treasury-debt-
limit.html?_r=0 (last visited June 28, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
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applied violation results in additional current economic harm by 
further degradation of the low-risk profile of the investment and 
further devaluation of the investment. The plaintiff suffers 
current noneconomic injury as his angst continues to worsen 
regarding the security, validity, and integrity of the investment.98  
As the defendants Treasury and Lew repeatedly 
acknowledge, full statutory enforcement will cause a government 
default resulting in “catastrophic” harm to bondholders.99 
Plaintiff suffers impending future economic harm manifesting as 
a substantial devaluation in his investments’ value, freezing of 
the liquidity of certain of his Treasury holdings—including his 
nonmarketable Certificate of Indebtedness core account—and 
devastation of his investments’ low-risk profile. Plaintiff suffers 
impending noneconomic injury of substantial worry and angst 
over his investments’ security, validity, and integrity.100   
The Treasury’s arbitrary enforcement of the statute 
separately violates plaintiff’s due process rights. The Treasury 
has no legal ability to mitigate harm to the bondholder plaintiff 
and without legal authority to prioritize bond payments, 
redemptions, and rollovers, the statute’s enforcement is 
necessarily arbitrary. Thus, in addition to violating the Public 
Debt Clause, both the preliminary statutory enforcement and the 
impending full statutory enforcement violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.101 The plaintiff also alleged 
that the debt limit statute violates the Constitution’s structural 
                                                                                                     
Lee Law Review). 
 98.  These current harms fully satisfy the “concrete” and “particularized” 
injury requirements articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 (1992). 
 99.  Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Treasury Report: The Potential 
Macroeconomic Effect of Debt Ceiling Brinksmanship 1 (2013), 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/POTENTIAL%20MACROECON
OMIC%20IMPACT%20OF%20DEBT%20CEILING%20BRINKMANSHIP.pdf 
(“A default would be unprecedented and has the potential to be 
catastrophic . . . there might be a financial crisis and recession that could echo 
the events of 2008 or worse.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) 
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Brinksmanship]. 
 100.  See Amended Complaint, Williams v. Lew, No. 15-5065 (D.C. Cir. May 
14, 2015) (arguing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653, No. 1553801).  
 101.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
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and functional separation of powers in preventing the Executive 
from carrying out sworn Article II, § 3 duties to “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.”102  
 
2. GAO’s 2015 Debt Limit Report: A Proxy Amicus Brief to 
Support Plaintiff  
As noted above, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
issued a Report in July 2015 entitled “Debt Limit: Market 
Response to Recent Impasses Underscores Need to Consider 
Alternative Approaches.”103 The final Report was based on two 
years of empirical research and was subjected to the econometric 
review of five independent economists.104 The investigative arm of 
Congress documented the direct costs of the default crisis to the 
federal government through increased borrowing costs—upwards 
of $70 billion. The Report explained in detail how the 2013 
default crisis, which caused instability in the Treasury market, 
also agitated other financial markets and threatened to do much 
worse systemic economic harm.   
The Report may also be read as, and was proffered to the 
appellate court to be, a proxy amicus brief in support of plaintiff’s 
allegations of past and current harms from the debt limit statute. 
In proof of plaintiff’s allegations of monetary harm, the GAO 
analysis evidenced significant damage to the value of Treasury 
securities during the 2013 default crisis. After the defendant 
Treasury Department began statutory enforcement of the debt 
limit with extraordinary measures and a full default loomed in 
fall 2013, the marketplace began a systematic degradation of 
short-term Treasury securities. This included “selling them, not 
purchasing them, and not using or accepting them as collateral in 
financial transactions.”105 The GAO research found that this 
degradation involved “hundreds of billions of dollars in Treasury 
                                                                                                     
 102.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
 103.  GAO Report, supra note 22, at 1. 
 104.  Id. at 4.  
 105.  Id. at 12 
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bills with payments due in late-October through mid-November 
2013.” The fact that the GAO Report repeatedly used the term 
“at-risk Treasury securities” to describe the affected investments 
is a sad congressional testament that validates plaintiff’s 
allegations that the debt limit statute damaged, and continues to 
damage, the once risk-free profile of his public debt portfolio.  
 And in support of plaintiff’s allegations of impending future 
harm to his individual holdings, the Report emphasized how 
“even a temporary delay in future debt payments” would cause 
“significant damage to Treasury securities and other assets.”106 
The Report was explicit that such damage “would affect not only 
institutions, but also individuals.”107 The damage will be both 
direct and indirect as changes in Treasuries’ value and 
risk-profile “affect everyone from individuals, whose pension and 
money market funds invest in these securities, to global financial 
institutions, whose daily transactions in Treasury securities are 
vital to the U.S. and global financial markets.” And the Report 
predicted future turmoil:  
Market participants we spoke with identified money market 
mutual funds as among the investors most affected by the debt 
limit impasse. All of the money market fund managers that we 
spoke with said that they had avoided at-risk Treasury 
securities during the 2011 or 2013 debt limit impasses or 
planned to do so during a future debt limit impasse.108 
Plaintiff’s allegations of nonmonetary harm (escalating levels 
of worry about the security of his Treasury investments) were 
corroborated by the GAO’s recorded interviews with a range of 
other (admittedly much more substantial) market participants. 
These investors expressed their own angst and concern. The 
Report details how investors were extremely nervous and how 
some had begun spurning the once risk-free Treasuries for fear of 
suffering losses or being subjected to delayed or even cancelled 
repayment: “Visual inspection of Treasury data and our 
interviews with market participants indicated that concern over 
                                                                                                     
 106. Id. at Report’s Cover, “What GAO Found.” 
 107. Id.  
 108.  Id. at 14.  
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the potential for market disruption escalated rapidly over the 
final days and weeks of the impasse.”109  
Providing the invaluable service for which the nonpartisan 
agency has been so highly-regarded for decades, GAO researchers 
ran econometric models that quantified the “timing, pace, and 
severity of the escalation of that concern.”110 As is the GAO’s 
custom and practice, illustrative Figures and Tables permeate 
the Report. The GAO Report described how investor fear 
continues to affect markets: 
 Several money market fund managers also told us that they 
spent a considerable amount of time and resources addressing 
client questions and concerns about their Treasury holdings 
and contingency plans in the event of a delayed payment. One 
fund manager who said they maintained their holdings of at-
risk securities during the 2011 and 2013 impasses told us that 
they are unlikely to do so in a future impasse in order to 
address client concerns.111 
Most relevant to its credibility and relevance as a proxy 
amicus brief in Williams v. Lew, the Report contains a statement 
of affirmance from Treasury’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Federal Finance who had reviewed it in draft: “Treasury agreed 
with the findings in the Report regarding primary and secondary 
market functioning during the 2013 debt limit impasse.” The 
defendant Treasury Department “stated that the findings 
corroborate Treasury’s observations as well as market color and 
commentary that Treasury received from market participants.”112 
This Treasury statement serves as the most recent example 
of the substantial divergence of public positions between the 
Justice Department (or at least the trial and appellate litigators 
assigned to Williams v. Lew) and its Treasury Department 
clients. The statement directly contradicts the Justice 
Department’s consistent assertion, described below, that the 
                                                                                                     
 109.  Id. at 58. 
 110.  Id. (“We identified two measures that proxy for the timing, pace, and 
severity of the escalation of that concern: Google Trends data and Bloomberg 
News Trends series counts of news articles that contain key phrases. See figure 
9 for an illustration of the Treasury yield dynamics and the proxy dynamics.”). 
 111.  Id. at 15. 
 112. Id. at 51.  
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defendant Treasury Department subscribes to the default-denial 
delusion that the debt limit statute does not cause Treasury debt 
holders both current and impending future harm. The GAO 
Report and the Treasury Department’s statement of affirmance of 
its findings also contradict the Justice Department litigators’ 
adoption of most recent GOP and Tea Party congressional 
assertions that the harm from a full breach of the debt limit 
statute could be mitigated by the proper management of daily 
inflows of revenues. 
3. The Justice Department’s Default-Denier Defense 
The Justice Department (DOJ), representing defendants Lew 
and the Treasury, successfully avoided a substantive analysis of 
the constitutional claims by lodging a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal 
motion on jurisdictional standing.113 In its cramped analysis of 
the plaintiff’s first amended complaint, 114 the DOJ ignored all 
current harm allegations and argued that a debt default was 
highly speculative and based only the hypothetical premise of a 
default.115 The DOJ invoked predictable Clapper v. Amnesty 
International116 quotations on standing restrictions.117 The 
district court, in its dismissal ruling of January 2015, mirrored 
the DOJ’s reading of the first amended complaint, erred in 
refusing to allow the plaintiff to further amend the complaint,118 
                                                                                                     
 113. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, 
Williams v. Lew, No. 1:14-cv-00183-RJL, 2015 WL 72968 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2015). 
 114.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss, Williams v. Lew, 1:14-cv-00183-RJL, 2015 WL 72968 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 
2015).  
 115.  Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 113.  
 116.  133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 117.  Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 113.  
 118.  The district court abused its discretion by denying in a docket Minute 
Order, without any stated reasons, plaintiff’s early-stage, good-faith motion to 
file a second amended complaint. The unopposed motion and proffered 
complaint were offered to clarify jurisdictional allegations regarding current 
harm. The court then compounded that error by ignoring repeated arguments 
about current harm contained in plaintiff’s response to the DOJ’s Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“The Court of Appeals 
also erred in affirming the District Court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to vacate 
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and broadly adopted the DOJ’s default-denial arguments in its 
Clapper risk analysis.119   
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, the plaintiff sought to correct and clarify his 
allegations of jurisdictional standing—pursuant to a 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1653 request to amend his complaint on appeal.120 
Nevertheless, the DOJ continued to minimize the plaintiff’s 
current harm arguments by contending that any averred current 
harm was actually based on fear of future default.  
The DOJ doubled down on default-denial theory at the D.C. 
Circuit. The DOJ promoted the district court’s finding that the 
plaintiff’s future harm claims were only hypothetical and 
speculative. The DOJ’s pleadings restated and argued from the 
district court’s finding of a speculative contingency chain:  
Here, there are a series of contingencies that would have to 
occur before Plaintiff would suffer any actual harm as a result 
of the debt limit statute. First, the debt limit itself must be 
reached. However, the debt limit is currently suspended 
through March 15, 2015. . . . Second, as Plaintiff’s complaint 
acknowledges, even if the debt limit is reached, Treasury has 
authority to take certain extraordinary measures to 
temporarily preserve lawful borrowing authority without 
                                                                                                     
the judgment in order to allow amendment of the complaint. As appears from 
the record, the amendment would have done no more than state an alternative 
theory for recovery.”); Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(“After the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, [the plaintiffs] 
could amend their complaint only by filing, as they properly did, a 59(e) motion 
to alter or amend a judgment combined with a Rule 15(a) motion requesting 
leave of court to amend their complaint.”); see also Barkley v. U.S. Marshals 
Service ex rel. Hylton, 776 F.3d 25, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(a) allows a plaintiff to amend a complaint ‘once as a matter of 
course’ within twenty-one days after service of a defendant’s answer or Rule 12 
motion. . . . ‘The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.’”).  
 119.  Williams v. Lew, No. 14–00183-RJL, 2015 WL 72968 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 
2015). 
 120.  See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larraine, 490 U.S. 826, 831 (1989) 
(“But § 1653 speaks of amending ‘allegations of jurisdiction,’ which suggests 
that it addresses only incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually 
exists, and not defects in the jurisdictional facts themselves.”); Abigail Alliance 
for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (overturned en banc on unrelated grounds) (granting the plaintiff’s motion 
pursuant to § 1653 “to remedy any possible shortcomings in its original 
complaint”). 
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exceeding the debt limit. Third, once such measures were 
hypothetically to be exhausted, the United States would be in 
the position of funding government obligations with the cash it 
would have on hand on any given day.121  
Obviously, the finding’s first two “speculative contingencies” 
had again been realized at the time of the appeal. And, as the 
plaintiff detailed in responding pleadings,122 the third stated 
contingency was based on distorted language from, and 
erroneously cited to, an August 2013 letter from Secretary Lew to 
House Speaker Boehner. The DOJ and the district court 
misstated and mischaracterized the letter; a qualifying “only” 
was omitted from the referenced sentence. The Lew letter 
actually stated that: “Treasury would be left to fund the 
government with only the cash we have on hand on any given 
day.”123 The letter then explained why such a “cash on hand” 
government-funding scenario was dangerous and 
“unacceptable.”124 
 Indeed, as the plaintiff repeatedly pled at the trial level, 
defendant Lew had often debunked the “cash on hand” myth, 
such as when he testified to the Senate Finance Committee in 
October 2013: “Let me remind everyone, principle on the debt is 
not something we pay out of our cash flow of revenues. Principle 
on the debt is something that is function of the market’s rolling 
over.”125  
                                                                                                     
 121.  See Treasury’s Summary Affirmance Motion, Williams v. Lew, No. 15-
5065 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2015) (restating and citing Williams v. Lew, 2015 WL 
72968, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2015)).  
 122.  See Williams’s Response in Opposition to Treasury’s Summary 
Affirmance Motion, Williams v. Lew, No. 15-5065 (D.C. Cir. May 11, 2015).  
 123.  Letter from Jacob Lew, Secretary of the Treasury, to Hon. John A. 
Boehner, Speaker of the House (Aug. 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/082613%20debt%20limit%20lette
r%20to%20congress.pdf (emphasis added). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Transcript: Jack Lew’s Testimony on Debt Ceiling, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/running-transcript-jack-lews-
testimony-on-debt-ceiling/2013/10/10/3edc0122-31b0-11e3-9c68-
1cf643210300_story.html (last visited July 8, 2015) (emphasis added) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Many of the DOJ’s appellate arguments closely paralleled the 
delusional default-denial thesis currently promoted by GOP and 
Tea Party congressional ideologues. The Justice Department’s 
reliance on the bond prioritization delusion—erroneously 
assuming that bond payment prioritization is legal and that daily 
cash inflows are adequate to prevent a catastrophic default—is 
most problematic.   
Separately characterizing the plaintiff’s discrete and 
particularized harms as a “generalized grievance,” the DOJ 
refused to consider the plaintiff’s appellate assertion that his 
particularized injuries are part of a classic “widely-shared” 
harm.126 The plaintiff’s pleadings referenced the Supreme Court’s 
Massachusetts v. EPA127 ruling that standing to litigate injuries 
stemming from harms as widely manifested as global warming 
was not defeated merely because greenhouse gas emissions inflict 
a widespread harm.128 In its reply, the DOJ correctly argued that 
“Massachusetts, as a sovereign State and not an individual, had a 
stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests. Williams has no 
such quasi-sovereign interests to protect.”129   
It is unlikely that the DOJ will address why its defense 
arguments are in such direct contradiction to the many public 
statements of its clients, Jacob Lew and Treasury Department. In 
light of federal courts’ continued mis-reliance on Clapper,130 it 
                                                                                                     
 126.  Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (ruling that even 
if the interest claimed by a plaintiff might be more readily addressed by the 
political branches, that “does not, by itself, automatically disqualify [it] for 
Article III purposes”). As did the district court, the government places a curious 
reliance on Reuss v. Balles to support a generalized grievance analysis. 584 F.2d 
461, 469–70 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Reuss involved a congressman’s challenge to the 
appointment process used to place members on the Federal Reserve’s Open 
Market Committee. The congressman-plaintiff failed to offer a causational link 
between the appointment process of members to the Committee and plaintiff’s 
public debt holdings. Reuss actually serves to emphasize, by contrast, the direct 
causational link that exists in Williams v. Lew.  
 127.  549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
 128.  Id. at 517.  
 129.  Treasury’s Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Affirmance at 
7–8, Williams v. Lew, No. 15-5065 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 2015).  
 130.  Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error 
Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA and City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127 (2014). 
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appears even less likely that the plaintiff in Williams v. Lew will 
be allowed to stand at bar to substantively challenge the 
unconstitutional debt limit statute. Still, there is additional 
present value to be realized in the test case.  
4. The DOJ’s Arguments Against Individual Bondholder 
Standing Makes the Case for Subsequent Litigation by Sovereign 
States and Institutional Investors 
The DOJ’s generalized grievance argument referencing 
Massachusetts v. EPA was all but an invitation to state sovereign 
bondholders to sue. Even in this age of increasingly restrictive 
standing jurisprudence, state sovereigns have very successfully 
defended their Article III standing to protect their independent 
proprietary, sovereign, and derivative quasi-sovereign interests. 
The unique historical position of states in our federal system 
assures state sovereigns unique litigation rights in the federal 
courts. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court explained 
that states are not “normal litigants” but are rather entitled to 
“special solicitude” in Article III standing analyses.131  
A state sovereign bondholder’s litigation against the debt 
ceiling would have strong and varied standing arguments based 
on each of the three recognized type interests—proprietary 
interests, sovereign interests, and quasi-sovereign interests.132 
During the 2011 default crisis, for example, the rating firm 
Moody’s issued analysis warning that a federal credit downgrade 
tied to a debt ceiling brinkmanship “would immediately lower 
ratings for 7,000 state and local issuances and possibly affect 
even some gold plated AAA states.”133 It is telling that the 
Treasury’s first “extraordinary measure” in debt limit 
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enforcement is curtailment of special securities to states required 
for their compliance with federal tax laws and arbitrage rules.134 
As in Bowen v. Massachusetts,135 a state sovereign could aver 
both current and certainly impending future harm to seek specific 
relief.136  
C. A Plea for State Sovereigns and Domestic Institutional 
Bondholders to Sue to Void the Debt Ceiling 
The debt ceiling’s constitutional violation is patent; “this wolf 
comes as a wolf.”137 The Executive, major financial institutions, 
state sovereigns, foreign sovereigns, and foreign investors must 
all recognize the current harm, and the future harm inherent, in 
the debt limit statute’s enforcement.138 Why is the Executive so 
reluctant to test a unilateral remedy?139 Why have large 
institutional, U.S. domestic, and foreign sovereign bondholders 
not yet attempted litigation to void the statute?   
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As with Tiberius’s “holding a wolf by the ears,”140 government 
officials and major institutional bondholders are perhaps afraid 
to let go of the debt-ceiling wolf. Again, U.S. Treasury debt is held 
and valued as a risk-free investment. Perhaps sovereign and 
institutional holders of Treasury debt are afraid that invoking the 
Public Debt Clause to initiate litigation against the debt ceiling 
would shock the markets, and that litigation would work to 
degrade and devalue their debt investments. What is certain is 
that congressional default-deniers exploit both the fear of the 
debt-limit wolf and the inverse fear of a released wolf—all while 
nurturing their own economic delusions.  
The time is now for state sovereigns and large domestic 
bondholders, with alternative and layered standing theories, to 
initiate litigation across the nation to void the debt ceiling 
statute. Such bondholders have the financial resources and 
institutional knowledge to initiate litigation with documented 
proof of current injury and impending future harm. This plea to 
immediately initiate litigation is directed primarily to state 
sovereigns, but also to domestic institutional holders of public 
debt.  
A direct appeal is made to public interest law groups on all 
points of the ideological spectrum to support such litigation. The 
influential Chamber of Commerce, representing over three 
million businesses, has pushed back against those extremist 
congressional ideologues who threaten a debt default. Its lobbying 
efforts were quite helpful in breaking the 2013 and 2014 
stalemates over further suspensions to debt limit law.141 Its elite 
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internal law firm, the National Chamber Litigation Center,142 has 
successfully initiated nationwide litigation supporting a range of 
pro-business causes, and it has achieved particular status and 
success at the Supreme Court bar.143 The National Chamber 
Litigation Center should join forces with a progressive public 
interest law organization, such as the equally influential 
Constitutional Accountability Center,144 to support nationwide 
adjudication against the unconstitutional debt limit law.145 Even 
if actual collaboration is not feasible, the two litigation 
powerhouses could work in tandem to void this dangerous 
statute. A national litigation effort with review running through 
various circuits would set the issue up for final high court 
resolution.    
State sovereigns and domestic bondholders should sue before 
foreign bondholders beat them to some unknown, foreign 
courthouse.146 Unlike overly adjudicated Argentinean defaulted 
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debt,147 our Treasury debt does not contain a default clause with 
a choice-of-forum provision. Foreign investors and foreign 
sovereigns could thus initiate litigation in foreign forums.148 
China has reemerged as the largest holder of our debt.149 Even if 
state sovereign and domestic institutional litigation is totally 
unsuccessful, the adjudication will send a strong signal to 
congressional ideologues to end their brinkmanship. Supreme 
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy is indeed right when he says:  
Any society that relies on nine unelected judges to resolve the 
most serious issues of the day is not a functioning democracy. I 
just don’t think that a democracy is responsible if it doesn’t 
have a political, rational, respectful, decent discourse so it can 
solve these problems before they come to the Court.150   
Even a failed litigation effort by a wide range of bondholders 
would lay a foundation for a full congressional repeal of the 
unconstitutional, dangerous statute as proposed by the July 2015 
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III. Conclusion 
 Throughout America’s history, buying government bonds 
has been a profoundly patriotic act, and the debt was considered 
as secure as the Republic’s continued existence. As the first 
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton said in 1790, “The debt 
of the United States, foreign and domestic, was the price of 
liberty.”151 Our government has used a variety of media 
campaigns to promote the patriotic act of bond-buying and to 
educate all as to the purpose of public debt.152 Proudly during 
peaceful times—and humbly during times of war—individual 
citizens, state sovereigns, and domestic institutions have held 
U.S. public debt.153   
Sovereign states and domestic institutional bondholders hold 
public debt knowing that the credit afforded their nation’s 
balance sheet allows their nation’s government—especially in 
times of severe budget deficits due to contracting private sector 
growth—to meet operational needs, provide state assistance, and 
honor entitlement debt obligations. Institutional bondholders 
hold public debt knowing that their success and future growth 
depend on the stability of the macroeconomy. Therefore, for these 
and many other reasons, these domestic bondholders should be 
charged with the rare responsibility of defending the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of the validity and integrity of public 
debt.  
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It was with a love of our nation, a concern for its economic 
wellbeing, and an anger that congressional brinkmanship 
continues to cause unnecessary worry to those Americans 
dependent on government benefit payments that this author 
initiated the Williams v. Lew test case.154 Now, it is time for a 
wide range of state sovereigns and domestic bondholders, 
supported by public interest groups like the National Chamber 
Litigation Center and the Constitutional Accountability Center, 
to litigate to void the debt ceiling. This litigation campaign is a 
necessary act of economic patriotism. 
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